The Synergy of Financial Sector Development and Information Sharing in Financial Access: Propositions and Empirical Evidence by Asongu, Simplice & Nwachukwu, Jacinta
  
The Synergy of Financial Sector 
Development and Information Sharing 
in Financial Access: Propositions and 
Empirical Evidence 
 
Asongu, S & Nwachukwu, J  
 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Asongu, S & Nwachukwu, J 2017, 'The Synergy of Financial Sector Development and 
Information Sharing in Financial Access: Propositions and Empirical 
Evidence' Research in International Business and Finance, vol 40, pp. 242-258 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.03.001   
 
DOI 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.03.001 
ISSN 0275-5319 
 
Publisher: Elsevier 
 
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in 
Research in International Business and Finance. Changes resulting from the 
publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, 
and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. 
Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. 
A definitive version was subsequently published in Research in International 
Business and Finance, [40, (2017)] DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.03.001 
 
© 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Synergy of Financial Sector Development and Information Sharing in 
Financial Access: Propositions and Empirical Evidence 
 
 
Forthcoming: Research in International Business and Finance  
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com   
 
 
Jacinta C. Nwachukwu 
Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, 
Faculty of Business, Environment and Society, 
Coventry University 
Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5DH, UK 
Email: jacinta.nwachukwu@coventry.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
The Synergy of Financial Sector Development and Information Sharing in Financial 
Access: Propositions and Empirical Evidence 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu  & Jacinta C. Nwachukwu 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study assesses the role of information sharing in financialization (or coexistence of financial 
sub-systems) for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-
contemporary Fixed Effects and Quantile regressions on 53 African countries for the period 
2004-2011. The positive complementarity of information sharing offices (ISOs) and financial 
formalization is an increasing function of financial activity (or access to credit) whereas the 
negative complementarity of ISOs and financial informalization is a decreasing function of 
financial activity. In order to leverage on the synergy between ISO and financial formalization 
for enhanced financial access, some policy measures are proposed.  
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1. Introduction 
 There are four main motivations for the positioning of the present inquiry. They are: (i)  
growing need for domestic sources of financial resources for Africa’s evolving investment 
constraints and insufficiencies in the corresponding financial development literature; (ii) high 
liquidity in African banking institutions; (iii) unexplored concepts of financialization
1
 within the 
framework of financial sector development and (iv) the need to model the complementarity 
between financialization and instruments of reducing information asymmetry (IA) throughout 
the conditional distribution of financial development.  
 First, according to Ndikumana and Blackson (2015), domestic investment is more 
sensitive to domestic sources of capital in African countries when compared to external flows, 
(e.g. foreign aid and foreign direct investment). The conclusion of the authors is broadly 
consistent with African business literature which agrees that the need for alternative sources of 
finance (after failed privatisation projects) is one of the most important business challenges (see 
Bartels et al., 2009; Darley, 2012; Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Tuomi, 2011;  Agbloyor et al., 
2013).  
The above policy syndrome is accounted-for by this study in the perspective that, 
financial development is conceived and defined in terms of the fundamental role of banking 
institutions which is to transform mobilised resources into credit for domestic investment 
purposes. This conception of financial development steers clear of the mainstream financial 
development literature in Africa which has not conceived financial efficiency within the 
framework of intermediation efficiency (see Al-Obaidan, 2008;  Ataullah et al. 2004; Kiyato, 
2009; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Kablan, 2010). Some peculiar measurements of financial 
efficiency have included: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for technical efficiency (Kablan, 
2009); cost efficiency (Mensah et al., 2012; Chen, 2009) and profit efficiency (Hauner & Peiris, 
2005).  
 Second, unfortunately the growing need for internal sources of finance starkly contrasts 
with the substantially documented issues of surplus liquidity in the banking establishments of 
Africa (Asongu, 2014a; Fouda, 2009; Saxegaard, 2006). Information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders in the banking industry has been documented to be a cause of excess 
                                                          
1
 Financialization should be understood in this study as the coexistence of financial sub-systems (formal semi-
formal and informal) that can be complementary with or substitutes for one another.  
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liquidity (see Asongu et al., 2016a). It is in efforts to reduce information asymmetry that over the 
past decades, information sharing offices (ISOs) have been introduced in the continent in order 
to help address concerns of moral hazard (adverse selection) in borrowers (lenders) (Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014). These information sharing offices include: public credit registries (PCRs) and 
private credit bureaus (PCBs)
2
.  
This study involves this dimension by employing information sharing offices as policy 
variables for the reduction of IA for enhanced financial allocation efficiency. There is also a 
twofold reason for this involvement. On the one hand, the literature on reducing IA by means of 
information sharing offices has for the most part been skewed towards developed countries and 
the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America, with less scholarly focus on Africa (see 
Barth et al.,  2009; love &  Mylenko, 2003; Galindo &  Miller, 2001). On the other, the scarce 
scholarly focus on Africa has failed to address the complementarity between information sharing 
offices and financial sector development in access to finance. To put this point into more 
perspective, Love and Mylenko (2003) have established that private registries are related to 
higher  levels in financial access while the effect of public credit registries in decreasing 
financial constraints in not apparent. Singh et al. (2009)   suggested that countries in Africa 
endowed with information sharing offices are linked to less financial constraints. According to 
Triki and Gajigo (2014) relative to private credit bureaus, public credit registries are less 
effective in driving financial access. Asongu et al (2016a) found that information sharing offices 
have been negatively associated with financial access while Asongu et al (2016b) concluded that 
relative to public credit registries, financial access is less sensitive to private credit bureaus. 
The first-two points on the relevance of positioning the inquiry in Africa can be 
synthesised with the viewpoint that investigating the link between financial access and 
information sharing in developing nations and specifically in Africa is a timely contribution to 
the literature because African countries are characterised with poor institutional and legal 
conditions (Goldberg & Veitch, 2010; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016). These institutional constraints 
tend to bolster informational issues in credit markets whether they are non-conventional 
(informal or semi-formal) or conventional (formal). Hence, overcoming informational issues is a 
major policy challenge for these countries particularly in terms of access to finance, financial 
sector development and formalization of the informal financial sector. The concern about 
                                                          
2‘Information sharing offices’ is used interchangeably with ‘public credit registries and private credit bureaus’.  
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financial exclusion is particularly relevant in Africa because whereas in most developing nations 
less than 50 percent of the population has access to financial services in the formal sector, in 
most African countries less than 20 percent of households have such access (Beck et al., 2009). 
Some of the shortcomings of financial exclusion include slow economic growth and persistent 
income inequality (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2008).  
 Third, the notion of financialization is a neglected dimension in the financial 
development literature. As argued by Asongu (2015a) and O’Toole (2014), a substantial bulk of 
literature in the area has been limited to more specific dimensions like bank participation and 
bank concentration. We deviate from this stream of the literature by engaging financial sector 
development in the perspective of fnancialization: the progress of one financial sector to the 
detriment of competing financial sectors. The engagement of this hitherto unexplored dimension 
merges two streams of literature by simultaneously contributing to the evolving literature on 
measuring financial development as well as to the economic development literature on 
mechanisms by which information sharing offices and financialization influence financial access. 
The twofold contribution also provides insights into a pragmatic way of disentangling the 
complementarity between different financial sectors and information sharing offices in financial 
access.  
 Fourth, it is important to account for initial levels of financial access in the modelling 
strategy because blanket policies based on mean values of financial access are not very likely to 
be efficient unless the modelling exercise accounts for existing levels of financial access such 
that the investigated relationships show countries with low, intermediate and high initial levels of 
financial access. The modelling strategy steers clear of recent literature on the IA-finance nexus 
which are  based on mean values of financial access, inter alia: Triki and Gajigo (2014) and  
Asongu et al. (2016a) have respectively employed Probit and Generalized Method of Moments 
models. In order to account for the concern of initial financial development levels, this study 
examines the suggested linkages throughout the conditional distributions of financial access 
using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions.  
 The theoretical underpinnings on the role of information sharing offices in the 
coexistence of financial subsystems for financial access are twofold. First, information sharing is 
linked to constraints in financial access in two main strands of the literature:  the first is 
concerned with the transformation of banks’ risk features while the second is oriented towards 
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channels through which liquidity provision by banks is consolidated (Claus & Grimes, 2003). 
Both views are consistent with the perspective that the fundamental mission of banks is 
allocation efficiency or the transformation of mobilised deposits into credit for investment 
purposes. Second,  information sharing offices  are in theory expected to be complementary with 
financial sector development or financialization in boosting financial allocation efficiency 
because information sharing offices are also designed to (i) boost competition within the 
financial sector  in order to enhance financial access and (ii) discipline borrowers by 
discouraging them from defaulting on their debts and resorting to the informal financial sector as 
a viable alternative to the formal sector (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Coccorese, 2012). It is 
interesting to note that informal financial circuits are particularly relevant in financing small and 
medium sized enterprises in Africa (Tchankam et al., 2016).     
This paper is not based on the assumption that the degree of ‘financial formalization 
would moderate the effect of information sharing on access to finance’ but on the assumption 
that ‘information sharing would moderate the effect of financial formalization on access to 
finance’. The policy or modifying variables are information sharing offices which can be 
introduced by governments. Our choice of ‘information sharing offices’ (instead of financial 
formalization) as modifying variable builds on the theoretical expectation of information sharing 
offices which are anticipated to enhance financial sector competition for financial access. 
Information sharing offices are likely to promote the formal financial sector to the detriment of 
the informal financial sector because they also play the role of market discipline by educating 
borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts and resorting to the informal financial sector 
as a viable alternative to the formal financial sector. It is important to note that whereas 
information sharing offices mitigate bank adverse selection ex-ante of lending by banks, they 
also play the role of reducing moral hazard in borrowers ex-post of lending.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the propositions, 
data and methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results and corresponding implications 
whereas Section 4 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Background, Literature Review and Positioning of the Inquiry   
Consistent with Mylenko (2008) and Tchamyou and Asongu (2017), before 2008, information 
sharing offices were predominately established in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
 7 
and Development (OECD) countries. After the 2008 financial crisis, the establishment of 
information sharing offices became a more important financial policy issue in developing 
countries. There were few countries with well-established information sharing offices in Sub-
Saharan Africa by 2008, with the exception of South Africa. A few nations (e.g. Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Mozambique) had instituted credit registries with the principal mission of 
consolidating supervision in the banking sector. Unfortunately, due to lack of relevant logistics 
and technology, accurate and timely information for the most part was not provided by the credit 
registries. 
Credit reference agencies or information sharing offices are institutions that are 
established to collect information related to the financial obligations of commercial and 
individual borrowers toward financial institutions. Such data is obtained from many sources, 
including: (i) retail lenders; (ii) direct assessments (for businesses) and (iii) public sources, credit 
card companies (related to individuals) and banks.  After cross-checking for a comprehensive 
report, the gathered data is then consolidated and can be used by present and future creditors. 
The information from the underlying report pertaining to credit history is for the most part 
characterised by  information of a positive and negative nature, notably: (i) negative data consists 
of default rate information whereas (ii) positive data entails details on repayment behaviour as 
well as all closed and open accounts.  
 Information sharing offices are relevant to enable financial institutions to increase credit 
availability to households and corporations. Hence, by reducing information asymmetry that 
constrains the ability of lenders to examine risk profiles, credit agencies play a vital role in 
economic prosperity. On the one hand, credit history data enables banks to tackle adverse 
selection because they can more exhaustively assess the reputational collateral of borrowers with 
information provided by information sharing offices. On the other, information sharing offices 
also mitigate moral hazard by addressing the issues surrounding the irresponsible behaviour of 
borrowers as far as debt repayment is concerned by helping to reduce default rates.  Ultimately, 
the corresponding boost in lending is essential for economic sectors with financial constraints in 
small, micro and medium enterprises (Asongu et al., 2016a).  
In accordance with Asongu et al (2016a), a considerable bulk of empirical literature on 
linkages between information sharing and financial development has focused on the relevance of 
information sharing between creditors and the effect of creditors’ right to better information. The 
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latter is for the most part concerned with how stronger creditors’ rights influence, among other 
things: risk-taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011); bankruptcy (Claessens 
& Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009) and tax evasion (Beck et al., 
2014). The former stream of the literature is focused on investigating how enhanced information 
sharing: consolidates credit availability (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014); mitigates rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); reduces credit cost (Brown 
et al., 2009); influences interventions of the antitrust nature (Coccorese, 2012); affects corrupt-
related lending (Barth et al., 2009) and impacts syndicated bank loans (Tanjung et al., 2010; 
Ivashina, 2009).  
 From the above literature, the scholarly emphasis has been on developed nations where 
financial access concerns are not as severe as in developing countries. Conversely, the African 
continent where financial access issues are most severe has not been given the scholarly attention 
it deserves. In the narrative that follows, we engage the relevant literature.     
Beck et al. (2014) have shown that corporations in nations with enhanced systems of 
information sharing and more branch penetration are associated with less tax evasion. This 
incidence is stronger for corporations in smaller towns and cities, small corporations and 
corporations in the industries that depend on external financing on the one hand and corporations 
in industries and nations with more potential for growth on the other.   
 Galindo and Miller (2001) have assessed the underlying issues from a macroeconomic 
perspective to establish that comparatively developed countries with credit registries are 
rewarded with fewer restrictions on  financial access compared to less developed countries with 
credit bureaus. More precisely, public credit registries that are well performing contribute 
considerably more to corporations reducing sensitivity to decisions of investment for ‘cash flow 
availability’, which is a characteristic proxy for financial constraint.  
 A combination of credit registries (public and private) as well as firm-related information 
from the World Bank Business Environment Survey has been used by Love and Mylenko (2000) 
to investigate if due to enhanced sharing of financial information from the perception of 
managers and banks, credit registries are negatively linked to financial access constraints. This  
finding has demonstrated that private credit bureaus are linked to lower constraints in financial 
access, whereas there is no significant impact on reducing financial access constraints from 
public credit registries.  
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Barth et al. (2009) have assessed the incidence of information sharing and competition 
between borrowers and lenders on corrupt-lending through information sharing offices to 
establish two main findings. On the one hand, corrupt-lending is reduced by competition 
between banks and information sharing plays a positive role in the reducing impact. On the 
other, the ownership structure of banks and corporations, competition between corporations and 
the legal environment engender considerable effect on the lending that is influenced by 
corruption.  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) have examined two overarching issues related to information 
asymmetry in the African banking industry, notably: the incidence of information sharing offices 
on access to finance by corporations and the effect of public credit registry design on the level of 
constraint in financial access. Their findings show that financial access is comparatively apparent 
in countries with private credit bureaus relative to their counterparts with no information sharing 
offices or public credit registries. Moreover, the authors also articulate that considerable 
heterogeneity is apparent in financial access and the way information sharing offices are 
designed.  
Asongu et al (2016a) have investigated thresholds of information sharing offices at which 
financial access is apparent in Africa to establish that both public credit registries and public 
credit bureaus have negative effects on financial depth, with higher effect from the latter.  The 
effect of public credit registries on banking system efficiency is insignificant whereas private 
credit bureaus exert a negative incidence. Both information sharing offices have negative 
impacts on financial activity, with a higher effect from private credit bureaus. Information 
sharing offices have a positive incidence on financial size, with the effect of having a lower 
magnitude from private credit bureaus. Consistent with the motivation in the introduction, this 
inquiry complements the existing literature in four main dimensions. 
 
3. Propositions, Data and Methodology 
3.1 Propositions 
 The propositions of financial sector development provided in Table 1 build on 
insufficiencies of the financial system definition by the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
(IMF, 2008) which has failed to account for the informal financial sector (see Asongu, 2014b). 
The neglected informal sector has been substantially documented in recent literature to have 
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positive development externalities in developing countries (see Meagher, 2013; Adeusi et al., 
2012; Aryeetey, 2005). In essence, the IFS definition is more relevant to developed countries 
because financial depth in the perspective of money supply is equal to liquid liabilities because 
almost every citizen has a bank account. Consequently almost all currency within developed 
countries circulates within formal banking establishments. Conversely, in developing countries, a 
great chunk of the monetary base does not circulate within the formal banking sector because a 
great proportion of population lack bank accounts.   
 In the light of above narrative, the propositions outlined in Table 1 challenge the existing 
IFS definition in three main areas, namely by: (i) integrating the informal financial sector into 
the conception, definition and measurement of the financial system; (ii) dissociating the existing 
definition into its formal and semi-formal components and (iii) introducing the concept of 
financialization within the framework of competition in the shares of the money supply between 
various financial sectors. The underlying propositions have been employed in recent 
development literature (see Asongu, 2015ab).  
 While Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-based measurements are provided in Panel A, the 
propositions in Panel B are related to competition in shares of money supply between various 
financial sectors. Within the latter framework, an improvement in the shares of money supply in 
one financial sector is to the detriment of competing sectors. Such improvements can be 
qualified as financial formalization, informalization, non-formalization and semi-formalization. 
For instance, financial formalization is the increase of money supply shares of the formal 
financial sector to the detriment of other financial sectors (semi-formal and informal) 
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Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits
3
  here refer to demand, time 
and savings deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits
4
 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)
5
 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)
6
. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)
7
. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ 
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 
8
 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one) arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector 
importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one 
sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015a).   
  
 It is important to note that in the measures of financial sector importance in Panel B, the 
numerator which is money supply captures both the deposit and credit dimensions of financial 
access. This is fundamentally because money supply denotes the ‘monetary base plus demand, 
                                                          
3
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
4
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
5
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking 
system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
6
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
7
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of 
formal and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432).  
8
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, 
meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal 
sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 
2015a, p. 432).  
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saving and time deposits’ and all components are converted into credit for economic operators. 
We cannot build two numerator indicators (one related to credit and the other to deposits) 
because it is difficult to distinguish between deposits and credit in the money supply. In essence, 
the money multiplier makes a number of assumptions which we do not engage because it would 
be out of scope. In essence, competition for shares in money supply from various financial 
sectors is for both deposits and credit. However, the dependent variables we employ in the 
empirical exercise clearly make the distinction between deposits and credit. Whereas ‘financial 
system efficiency’ appreciates the ability of  financial institutions to transform deposits into 
credit for economic operators, ‘financial system activity’ appreciates the ability of financial 
institutions to grant credit to economic operators.    
 
3.2 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African nations with data for the period 2004 to 2011 from the 
Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) and African Development Indicators 
(ADI) of the World Bank. The periodicity begins from 2004 because data on information sharing 
offices are only available from this year while it ends in 2011 because it is the latest year in the 
FDSD. Consistent with recent IA literature (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014), information sharing 
offices are measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR).  
 Two sets of financialization indicators are employed, namely: Proposition 5 (or financial 
sector formalization) and Proposition 7 (or financial sector informalization). While due to 
constraints in degrees of freedom, Proposition 6 (or financial sector semi-formalization) is not 
used, Proposition 7 displays a high degree of substitution with Proposition 8 (or financial sector 
non-formalization).    
 Adopted measurements of financial development are in accordance with the discussed 
policy syndrome of excess liquidity in African financial institutions, namely, financial allocation 
dynamics of activity and efficiency.  On the one hand, financial allocation efficiency is measured 
as the ability to transform mobilised deposits into credit with  (i) banking-system-efficiency 
(‘banking system credit’ on ‘banking system deposits’) and (ii) financial-system-efficiency 
(‘financial system credit’ on ‘financial system deposits’).  On the other, two measurements of 
financial allocation activity are also employed, namely  (i) banking system activity (‘private 
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domestic credit by deposit banks’) and (ii) financial system activity (‘private domestic credit by 
deposit banks and other financial institutions’).  
 The study accounts for omitted variable bias with seven control variables, two dummy 
and five non-dummy variables. First, the dummy variables are income levels and legal origins 
from Asongu (2014b, p. 364)
9
 and La Porta et al (2008, p. 289) respectively. Compared to 
French civil law countries, English common law countries are theoretically expected to enjoy 
higher levels of financial development because of advantages in adaptability and political 
mechanisms (see Beck et al., 2003). The position of Jaffee and Levonian (2001) that high 
income nations are associated with high levels of financial development has been confirmed by 
Asongu (2012a) from a within-Africa framework in which middle-income countries are linked 
with higher financial development levels when compared with their low income counterparts.  
 Second, the choice of the five non-dummy variables is in accordance with the covariates 
of financial development in recent literature (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 
2014c;  Owosu & Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b). These are: trade 
openness, public investment, foreign aid, GDP growth and inflation. (1) Foreign aid is 
theoretically anticipated to reduce the savings-investment gap in less developed countries 
(Easterly, 2005). However, from a practical angle, the relationship could also be negative for at 
least two main reasons. On the one hand, a substantial quantity of disbursed funds can be 
withheld in developed countries for administrative and consultancy purposes. On the other, a 
substantial portion of the disbursed funds that actually reach destination countries can be 
siphoned off and deposited in microstates or tax havens that are under the jurisdictions of donor 
countries.  (2) While investment (Huang, 2011) and trade openness (Do & Levchenko, 2004; 
Huang & Temple, 2005) have been established as  positively affecting financial access, the 
linkage could also be negative contingent respectively on the balance of trade and type of 
investment. On the one hand, a balance of trade surplus (deficit) is more likely to positively 
(negatively) influence financial development. On the other, from intuition, private investment is 
more likely to increase financial development, compared to public investment that is more likely 
to be associated with corruption in the procurement and implementation of contracts. (3) The 
negative association between high or chaotic inflation and less efficiency in a financial 
                                                          
9
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high annual income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle 
income, $3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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intermediary institution is consistent with the empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) and theoretical 
(Huybens & Smith, 1999) literature. (4) Many studies support the view that economic prosperity 
in terms of GDP growth is associated with higher degrees of financial access because of inter 
alia  availability of more credit for investment purposes and enhanced competition (Levine, 
1997; Jaffee & Levonian 2001). Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively present 
the definition of variables, summary statistics and correlation matrix. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 We complement the Quantile with Fixed Effects regressions because whereas the former 
accounts for initial levels of financial development, the latter controls for the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
The panel Fixed Effects model is presented as in Eq. (1) below: 
tiitih
h
htitititi WPISOISOPFA ,,,
5
1
,3,2,10,    

   (1) 
Where: tiFA ,  
is an indicator of financial access (financial efficiency or financial activity) of 
country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
P , is  a proposition (Proposition 5 or Proposition 7); 
ISO  denotes information sharing offices (public credit registries or private credit bureaus); 
PISO , interaction between propositions (P) and information sharing offices (ISO);
 
W  is the 
vector of control variables  (foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public investment, inflation);
 i

 
is 
the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term. It important to note that legal origin and 
income level dummy variables are not included in the Fixed Effects regressions because they are 
already captured in country-specific effects
10
.  
In order to account for existing financial access levels, this study employs the quantile 
regressions (QR) estimation approach. The modelling technique investigates the relationships 
throughout the conditional distributions of the dependent variable (see Keonker & Hallock, 
2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). The strategy enables the study to show 
countries with high, intermediate and low initial levels of financial access.  
 The existing literature on reducing IA has estimated parameters at the conditional mean 
of financial access (e.g. Asongu et al., 2016a; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). Whereas mean effects are 
                                                          
10
 Moreover, if two dummy variables with perfect multicollinearity entered simultaneously into a specification, one 
is automatically omitted by the Stata software in the regression output. 
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relevant, this study complements the highlighted literature with conditional effects because 
blanket policy recommendations based on mean effects are unlikely to be effective unless they 
are contingent on existing levels of it and tailored differently across countries with varying levels 
of financial access. Furthermore, while estimation strategies that are based on mean impacts like 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are founded on the hypothesis of normally distributed error terms, 
such assumption of normality is not apparent in the QR technique.  
The  th quantile estimator of financial access is obtained by solving for the optimization 
problem in Eq. (2), which is provided without subscripts for simplicity and ease of presentation.   
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Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, QR minimise the weighted sum of absolute deviations, for example the 25
th
 or 
75
th
 quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the residuals. The 
conditional quintile of financial access or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (3) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of financial access. For the model in Eq. (3) the dependent 
variable iy  is a financial development indicator whereas ix  contains a constant term, information 
sharing offices, Propositions, ISO×Propositions, foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public 
investment, inflation, middle income and Common law.  In accordance with Brambor et al. 
(2006) on the pitfalls of interactive regressions, estimates from the interactions are considered as 
marginal and conditional impacts. Furthermore, the net effect or overall impact is computed with 
unconditional and conditional effects. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline fixed effect results 
 Table 2 presents baseline results from panel Fixed Effects. The choice of a Fixed Effects 
versus a Random Effects model is justified by the outcome of the Hausman test which is 
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overwhelmingly positive across panels and specifications. Whereas Panel A presents findings on 
the linkages between ‘financial access, financialization and public credit registries’, Panel B 
presents results corresponding to linkages between ‘‘financial access, financialization and private 
credit bureaus. The purpose of lagging the independent variables in the non-contemporary 
specifications by one period is to have more bite on endogeneity (see Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 
21).  
The findings are discussed in terms of net effects which are computed from: (i) the 
marginal or conditional effect with information sharing offices and (ii) the unconditional impact 
of financialization.  For instance, in Column 2 of Panel A, the unconditional effect of financial 
formalization (or Prop. 5) is -35.478 while the conditional impact with public credit registries 
(PCR × Prop. 5) is 7.583. The corresponding net effect is -19.136 ([2.155 ×7.583] + -35.478)
11
.  
 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Regressions  
         
 Panel A: Financial Access, Financialization and Public Credit Registries 
 Dependent variables 
 BSE FSE BSA FSA BSE FSE BSA FSA 
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
         
Constant  107.804*** 120.421*** 23.174*** 25.799*** 87.086*** 101.243*** 22.682*** 25.750*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR -6.668*** -5.481*** 0.400*** 0.379*** -4.024* -5.027** 0.426*** 0.414*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.015) (0.000) (0.001) 
Prop. 5 -35.478*** -44.753*** --- --- -11.197 -21.383 --- --- 
 (0.027) (0.003)   (0.454) (0.126)   
Prop.7 --- --- -18.873*** -26.647*** --- --- -22.196*** -27.716*** 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR×Prop. 5 7.583*** 6.291*** --- --- 4.784* 5.834** --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.002)   (0.053) (0.012)   
PCR×Prop.7 --- --- -1.863*** -1.948** --- --- -0.993 -1.011 
   (0.009) (0.016)   (0.241) (0.265) 
GDP growth  0.453** 0.346** -0.153** -0.147** 0.391** 0.425** -0.111* -0.126* 
 (0.018) (0.049) (0.012) (0.033) (0.030) (0.012) (0.068) (0.054) 
Inflation 0.074 -0.024 -0.020 -0.026 -0.329** -0.204 -0.123** -0.139** 
 (0.615) (0.856) (0.666) (0.622) (0.033) (0.153) (0.019) (0.013) 
Public Invt.  0.578** 0.554** 0.402*** 0.422*** 0.413 0.392 0.194** 0.184* 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.104) (0.028) (0.052) 
Foreign Aid  -0.921*** -0.930*** -0.036 0.003 -0.610*** -0.671*** 0.034 0.064 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.965) (0.007) (0.002) (0.655) (0.429) 
Trade  -0.083 -0.090 -0.007 0.002 -0.036 -0.073 0.027 0.032 
 (0.244) (0.170) (0.727) (0.925) (0.605) (0.269) (0.249) (0.214) 
         
Net effects  -19.136 -31.195 -22.887 -30.844 na na na na 
Hausman test 15.27* 21.73*** 42.10*** 36.20*** 32.61*** 17.70** 38.43*** 34.91*** 
         
Within R² 0.117 0.125 0.278 0.264 0.112 0.124 0.265 0.264 
Fisher  4.02*** 4.35*** 11.68*** 10.88*** 3.25*** 3.67*** 9.31*** 9.27*** 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
                                                          
11
 2.155 is the mean value of public credit registries.  
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Observations  295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 
         
         
 Panel B: Financial Access, Financialization and Private Credit Bureaus 
 Dependent variables 
 BSE FSE BSA FSA BSE FSE BSA FSA 
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
Constant  96.918*** 110.351*** 24.889*** 26.957*** 80.966*** 94.462*** 25.072*** 27.969*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 2.369** 1.904** 0.059 -0.007 1.493 1.735* 0.024 -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.046) (0.364) (0.921) (0.143) (0.067) (0.717) (0.661) 
Prop. 5 -18.853 -29.009** --- --- -0.285 -10.254 --- --- 
 (0.221) (0.040)   (0.984) (0.433)   
Prop.7 --- --- -23.434*** -27.636*** --- --- -28.235*** -32.215*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB×Prop. 5 -3.215*** -2.766*** --- --- -2.409** -2.648*** --- --- 
 (0.003) (0.005)   (0.021) (0.006)   
PCB×Prop.7 --- --- 0.052 -0.699* --- --- 0.326 -0.003 
   (0.885) (0.086)   (0.426) (0.994) 
GDP growth  0.352* 0.254 -0.157** -0.151** 0.305* 0.329** -0.111* -0.124* 
 (0.059) (0.134) (0.013) (0.031) (0.075) (0.038) (0.082) (0.066) 
Inflation 0.040 -0.043 -0.042 -0.053 -0.339** -0.227* -0.136** -0.153*** 
 (0.776) (0.737) (0.385) (0.320) (0.019) (0.088) (0.012) (0.008) 
Public Invt.  0.517** 0.522** 0.367*** 0.380*** 0.414* 0.402* 0.177* 0.170* 
 (0.035) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.069) (0.050) (0.076) 
Foreign Aid  -0.787*** -0.813*** -0.011 0.014 -0.523** -0.584*** 0.062 0.087 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.884) (0.867) (0.015) (0.004) (0.438) (0.303) 
Trade  -0.053 -0.063 -0.016 -0.005 -0.004 -0.037 0.020 0.024 
 (0.442) (0.322) (0.494) (0.828) (0.950) (0.554) (0.415) (0.361) 
         
Net Effects  na -40.689 na -30.587 na na na na 
         
Hausman test 31.39*** 63.74*** 14.19* 31.21*** 28.87*** 61.83*** 14.34* 36.97*** 
Within R² 0.153 0.179 0.213 0.225 0.194 0.216 0.174 0.190 
Fisher  5.49*** 6.62*** 8.23*** 8.83*** 6.24*** 7.14*** 5.48*** 6.08*** 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. BSE: Banking System 
Efficiency. FSE: Financial System Efficiency. BSA: Banking System Activity. FSA: Financial System Activity.  na: not applicable because at 
least one component necessary in the computation of the net effect is not statistically significant.   
 
Overall from the findings, whereas net effects from non-contemporary regressions are not 
apparent, corresponding net impacts from contemporary regressions are negative for the most 
part. The fact that financial formalization interacts with information sharing offices to have an 
overall negative effect on the engaged financial access variables (banking system efficiency, 
financial system efficiency, banking system activity and financial system activity) is not 
consistent with economic theory. A possible reason for these unexpected findings is the fact that; 
the investigated relationships are at the mean value of the dependent variables.  In the section 
that follows, the reported findings relax the assumption of modelling at mean values of the 
dependent variables and assess the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of the 
dependent variables.   
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4.2 Main quantile regression results 
The results are presented in two main sections: one on public credit registries and the other on 
private credit bureaus. The first (second) table of each section presents results for financial 
allocation efficiency (financial activity). The right-hand-side (RHS) shows non-contemporary 
regressions while the left-hand-side (LHS) of each table presents contemporary regressions.  
Consistent with the discourse in Table 1, the purpose of lagging the independent variables on the 
RHS by one period is to have some bite on endogeneity. Hence, the specifications are tailored to 
have some control on endogeneity by controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of 
fixed effects and simultaneity with non-contemporary specifications. For each table, the baseline 
estimations in Panel A entail interactions between financial formalization and information 
sharing offices for banking system finance whereas Panel B entails robustness checks on 
interactions between financial informalization  and information sharing offices for financial 
system finance. Regardless of tables, consistent differences in ‘mean estimated effects’ (or from 
OLS) and ‘conditional estimated impacts’ (or from quintiles) justify the choice of the estimated 
technique.  
 
4.2.1 Financial access, financialization and private credit registries (PCR) 
 
The findings are engaged in terms of net impacts which are computed from (i) marginal or 
conditional effect with public credit registries and (ii) the unconditional impact of 
financialization. In Table 3 on linkages between ‘financial allocation efficiency, financialization 
and public credit registries’, the net effects are significant (i) only at the 50th quintile on the RHS 
of Panel A and (ii) only at the 25
th
 quintiles. For instance, at the 50
th
 quintile on the RHS of 
Panel A, the unconditional impact of financial formalization (or Prop. 5) is 26.152 while the 
conditional impact with the public credit registries (PCR × Prop. 5) is -10.43. The corresponding 
net effect is 3.675 ([2.155 ×-10.43] + 26.152)
12
.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 2.155 is the mean value of public credit registries.  
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Table 3: Financial Allocation Efficiency, Financialization and Public Credit Registries  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency and Formalization (with Prop. 5) 
Dependent variable: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  79.995*** 16.015 35.703*** 79.381*** 85.126*** 130.07*** 73.642*** 11.198 27.536** 75.623*** 98.259*** 125.64*** 
 (0.000) (0.212) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.333) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 4.048 -0.190 7.207* 3.208 7.952** -6.649* 5.085 -0.195 7.884 10.477*** 8.855** -4.538 
 (0.183) (0.962) (0.091) (0.205) (0.036) (0.094) (0.139) (0.989) (0.132) (0.001) (0.028) (0.268) 
Prop. 5 26.975* 50.657*** 58.229*** 30.281*** 36.609 17.623 27.467** 59.015*** 62.754*** 26.152** 23.023 20.216 
 (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.109) (0.535) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.267) (0.459) 
PCR×Prop. 5 3.802 1.353 -6.775 -2.721 -8.081* 7.025 -4.784 1.443 -7.444 -10.43*** -9.170** 4.485 
 (0.245) (0.756) (0.141) (0.334) (0.055) (0.106) (0.195) (0.715) (0.190) (0.003) (0.040) (0.284) 
GDP growth  0.111 0.281 0.324 -0.520 0.339 0.036 0.275 1.034*** 0.836* -0.082 -0.693 0.135 
 (0.790) (0.519) (0.474) (0.117) (0.610) (0.960) (0.485) (0.000) (0.072) (0.811) (0.264) (0.795) 
Inflation -0.237** -0.011 -0.074 -0.139*** -0.025 -0.092* -0.220** -0.275*** -0.390*** -0.131*** -0.195*** -0.177*** 
 (0.028) (0.769) (0.132) (0.001) (0.626) (0.092) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Public Invt.  -1.139*** -1.021** -1.180** -0.735** -1.166* -1.400*** -1.056*** -1.263*** -1.051** -0.801** -0.745 -1.539*** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.057) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.038) (0.019) (0.104) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.290 0.311 -0.098 -0.254 -0.471 -0.995* -0.208 0.498 0.051 -0.219 -0.569 -0.616** 
 (0.202) (0.367) (0.762) (0.238) (0.216) (0.053) (0.320) (0.139) (0.876) (0.330) (0.118) (0.045) 
Trade  -0.212*** -0.164** -0.208** -0.292*** -0.224*** -0.227** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.199** -0.229*** -0.232*** -0.277** 
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.012) (0.000) (0.007) (0.048) (0.000) (0.008) (0.024) (0.000) (0.003) (0.020) 
Middle Income 3.682 5.260 -5.917 2.356 5.329 19.119*** 3.773 5.732 -4.460 1.393 7.661 24.064*** 
 (0.299) (0.375) (0.303) (0.541) (0.354) (0.007) (0.310) (0.281) (0.437) (0.740) (0.158) (0.000) 
Common Law -4.834 -3.811 -3.731 -4.716 -13.53*** -23.42*** -3.929 -3.088 -2.458 -3.576 -8.165* -26.01*** 
 (0.111) (0.468) (0.481) (0.156) (0.006) (0.000) (0.216 (0.524) (0.663) (0.335) (0.076) (0.000) 
Net  effects  na na na na na na na na na 3.675 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.171 0.154 0.136 0.121 0.105 0.177 0.190 0.182 0.147 0.120 0.131 0.214 
Fisher  5.84***      5.53***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency and Informalization (with Prop.7) 
Dependent variable: Financial System Efficiency 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  141.25*** 78.945*** 82.064*** 112.62*** 137.04*** 241.25*** 138.75*** 73.251*** 96.197*** 103.65*** 123.26*** 241.36*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR -0.477 1.027*** 0.350 0.546* -0.109 0.255 -0.450 1.217*** 0.344 0.615 -0.202 0.482 
 (0.222) (0.000) (0.416) (0.052) (0.831) (0.783) (0.310) (0.000) (0.395) (0.203) (0.751) (0.647) 
Prop.7 -105.2*** -73.45*** -41.62*** -22.87*** -48.405* -0.128* -106.8*** -59.26*** -75.28*** -5.170 -36.371 -128.948 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.055) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.685) (0.201) (0.104) 
PCR×Prop.7 7.291* -1.024 8.005* 1.973 6.591 -13.054 7.907* -1.652 8.025* 3.341 6.813 -16.571* 
 (0.052) (0.765) (0.089) (0.383) (0.111) (0.136) (0.078) (0.619) (0.057) (0.413) (0.194) (0.077) 
GDP growth  -0.065 0.145 0.381 -0.542** -1.344* 0.480 0.210 0.497** 0.792** 0.131 -0.279 0.461 
 (0.914) (0.500) (0.430) (0.045) (0.055) (0.783) (0.727) (0.029) (0.020) (0.743) (0.723) (0.820) 
Inflation -0.169*** -0.096*** -0.017 -0.102*** -0.095* -0.201** -0.249** -0.204*** -0.316*** -0.199** -0.127** -0.279** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.714) (0.002) (0.084) (0.010) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.017) (0.018) 
Public Invt.  -1.690*** -1.324*** -0.626 -0.768*** -1.192* -1.745*** -1.687*** -1.347*** -1.162*** -1.033*** -1.084 -1.768** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.179) (0.002) (0.062) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.133) (0.025) 
Foreign Aid  -0.496* 0.114 -0.026 -0.375** -0.320 -2.164** -0.449 0.360 -0.127 -0.068 -0.355 -2.069** 
 (0.098) (0.646) (0.933) (0.029) (0.469) (0.042) (0.107) (0.157) (0.608) (0.795) (0.449) (0.034) 
Trade  -0.312*** -0.172*** -0.250*** -0.325*** -0.304*** -0.660*** -0.303*** -0.181*** -0.215*** -0.304*** -0.218** -0.679*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.02) (0.000) 
Middle Income 3.345 4.377 1.809 2.794 7.150 19.033 3.446 5.848 -6.005 4.456 11.013 18.156 
 (0.456) (0.271) (0.748) (0.360) (0.235) (0.101) (0.461) (0.160) (0.173) (0.359) (0.105) (0.146) 
Common Law -9.241** -7.097* -2.083 -6.434** -11.569** -30.23*** 8.534** -5.886 -3.141 -7.445* -14.483** -29.36*** 
 (0.018) (0.057) (0.693) (0.018) (0.022) (0.000) (0.038) (0.104) (0.463) (0.083) (0.017) (0.000) 
Net  effects -89.487 na -24.369 na na na -89.760 na -57.986 na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.285 0.151 0.118 0.108 0.083 0.247 0.297 0.173 0.122 0.102 0.083 0.270 
 20 
Fisher  5.38***      31.721***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial activity is least. na: not applicable because at least one component necessary in the computation of the net effect is not 
statistically significant.   
 
 
 
Table 4: Financial Allocation Activity, Financialization and Public Credit Registries  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Activity and Formalization (with Prop.5) 
Dependent variable: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -14.47*** -8.876*** -9.027** -13.47*** -5.052 4.630 -14.29*** -9.002*** -7.976** -13.90*** -7.279 -0.474 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.509) (0.607) (0.003) (0.000) (0.023) (0.001) (0.332) (0.950) 
PCR -3.079 -4.193*** -0.639 -1.776* -3.461* -4.295** -3.587* -7.392*** 0.133 -1.624 -4.686** -6.046*** 
 (0.120) (0.000) (0.623) (0.063) (0.063) (0.023) (0.081) (0.000) (0.924) (0.213) (0.010) (0.007) 
Prop.5 62.338*** 26.562*** 34.102*** 51.195*** 60.039*** 55.931*** 62.678*** 29.204*** 32.453*** 52.136*** 64.865*** 60.755*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR×Prop5 4.673** 5.457*** 2.165 3.568*** 5.143** 6.029*** 5.420** 9.566*** 1.416 3.507** 6.865*** 8.322*** 
 (0.027) (0.000) (0.124) (0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.000) (0.353) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.275 -0.271*** -0.361** -0.270** 0.048 -0.061 -0.199 -0.233* -0.254 -0.132 0.042 -0.060 
 (0.158) (0.000) (0.043) (0.032) (0.813) (0.809) (0.342) (0.076) (0.120) (0.393) (0.870) (0.681) 
Inflation -0.051** -0.059*** -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 -0.038** -0.081* -0.108*** -0.091*** -0.019 -0.043** -0.064*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.165) (0.122) (0.371) (0.033) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.170) (0.020) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.679*** -0.051 -0.150 -0.321*** -0.891*** -1.050*** -0.759*** -0.087 -0.180 -0.362** -0.941*** -1.121*** 
 (0.000) (0.479) (0.334) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.458) (0.337) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.300*** -0.0001 -0.069 -0.108 -0.478*** -0.473** -0.322*** -0.044 -0.047 -0.152 -0.551*** -0.454*** 
 (0.001) (0.997) (0.499) (0.188) (0.007) (0.019) (0.000) (0.411) (0.598) (0.122) (0.001) (0.004) 
Trade  -0.070*** -0.010 -0.038* -0.063*** -0.072** -0.103*** -0.068*** -0.017 -0.046** -0.069*** -0.058* -0.067** 
 (0.003) (0.262) (0.098) (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.007) (0.300) (0.039) (0.003) (0.054) (0.012) 
Middle Income 3.699** -1.821** -1.409 3.149** 8.667*** 15.002*** 3.557* -2.653*** 0.432 3.138* 5.647** 11.896*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.444) (0.032) (0.001) (0.000) (0.050) (0.008) (0.792) (0.085) (0.020) (0.000) 
Common Law -5.691*** -1.435** -0.663 -5.486*** -8.969*** -7.714*** -5.482*** -0.219 0.499 -5.492*** -10.20*** -7.673*** 
 (0.006) (0.039) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.840) (0.749) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Net  effects 72.408 38.321 na 58.884 71.122 68.923 74.358 49.818 na 59.693 79.659 78.688 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.586 0.193 0.223 0.324 0.460 0.552 0.600 0.209 0.238 0.332 0.475 0.575 
Fisher  51.31***      36.12***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity and Informalization (with Prop.7) 
Dependent variable: Financial  System Activity 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  70.158*** 16.523*** 26.027*** 42.245*** 66.594*** 109.60*** 70.827*** 17.068*** 27.082*** 41.365*** 67.687*** 111.87*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR 1.231*** 2.081*** 1.529*** 1.788*** 1.509*** 1.182* 1.427*** 2.200*** 1.636*** 1.892*** 1.639*** 1.415* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) 
Prop.7 -110.8*** -9.215*** -34.17*** -59.22*** -83.35*** -111.4*** -112.4*** -22.12*** -33.02*** -59.54*** -80.71*** -122.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCR×Prop.7 -3.284 -22.56*** -2.296 -3.817*** -5.298*** -9.117** -3.977 -9.733*** -2.748* -3.689*** -5.901** -11.30 
 (0.177) (0.000) (0.215) (0.000) (0.006) (0.047) (0.122) (0.000) (0.092) (0.003) (0.013) (0.122) 
GDP growth  -0.293 -0.266*** -0.392* -0.190* -0.086 0.052 -0.192 -0.214 -0.272 0.127 0.173 -0.259 
 (0.331) (0.003) (0.078) (0.074) (0.732) (0.913) (0.558) (0.162) (0.120) (0.322) (0.535) (0.790) 
Inflation -0.104*** -0.059*** -0.033* -0.040*** -0.060 -0.139*** -0.141** -0.085*** -0.178*** -0.047 -0.069*** -0.194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.002) (0.219) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.001) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.978*** -0.059 -0.168 -0.455*** -0.953*** -1.407*** -1.092*** -0.083 -0.217 -0.518*** -1.083*** -1.475*** 
 (0.000) (0.485) (0.384) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.540) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  -0.470*** -0.009 -0.072 -0.143** -0.408** -1.073** -0.487*** -0.049 -0.101 -0.164** -0.627*** -1.101** 
 (0.001) (0.864) (0.577) (0.037) (0.021) (0.034) (0.001) (0.443) (0.277) (0.047) (0.001) (0.034) 
Trade  -0.118*** -0.018 -0.041 -0.077*** -0.122*** -0.231*** -0.116*** -0.017 -0.048** -0.074*** -0.104*** -0.167** 
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 (0.000) (0.106) (0.146) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.200) (0.043) (0.000) (0.001) (0.036) 
Middle Income 2.665 -0.732 -0.849 3.327*** 11.677*** 9.976* 2.559 -0.976 -0.573 3.363** 7.746*** 5.059 
 (0.255) (0.440) (0.715) (0.007) (0.000) (0.072) (0.312) (0.414) (0.754) (0.027) (0.003) (0.462) 
Common Law -8.826*** -1.205 -1.226 -7.139*** -13.11*** -13.18*** -8.667*** -0.104 -0.793 -7.402*** -12.82*** -10.537** 
 (0.000) (0.149) (0.566) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.934) (0.650) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) 
Net  effects na -57.831 na -67.445 -94.767 -131.047 na -43.094 -38.941 -67.489 -93.426 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.606 0.166 0.185 0.285 0.404 0.502 0.616 0.178 0.201 0.292 0.415 0.521 
Fisher  43.38***      30.70***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 259 259 259 259 259 259 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial activity is least. na: not applicable because at least one component necessary in the computation of the net effect is not 
statistically significant.   
 
 
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on linkages between ‘public 
credit registries, financialization and allocation activity’. In Panel A, with the exception of the 
25
th
 quintile, the net effect of public credit registries in financial formalization for allocation 
activity in the banking system is consistently positive throughout the conditional distributions of 
banking system activity. The fact that corresponding conditional and unconditional impacts are 
consistently positive is evidence of ‘synergy effects’. In Panel B, with the exception of one 
quintile on either the LHS or RHS, the net effect of public credit registries in financial 
informalization for allocation activity in the financial system is consistently negative.  
Most of the significant control variables have expected signs. The unanticipated negative 
impact of Common law countries that runs counter to the law and finance theory of Beck et al 
(2003) can be elicited by recent law-finance literature in Africa. Asongu (2012b) has established 
that while Common law countries dominate in terms of financial depth and size in Africa, French 
civil law countries dominate in financial allocation efficiency because with their memberships in 
currency unions, they have opted for monetary stability and dependence instead of monetary 
independence. The channel by which membership in a monetary union leads to allocation 
efficiency is a relative certainty in inflation.  
 
4.2.2 Financial access, financialization and private credit bureaus  
The following findings can be established from Table 5 on linkages between ‘private 
credit bureaus, financialization and allocation efficiency’. In Panel A, with the exception of the 
10
th
 quintile where the net effect of private credit bureaus in financial formalization for 
allocation efficiency in the banking system is positive, the net effects are not overwhelmingly 
significant. In Panel B, the net effects of private credit bureaus in financial informalization for 
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allocation efficiency in the financial system are conflicting in terms of signs and ‘significance of 
quintiles’ in both the RHS and LHS 
Table 5: Financial Allocation Efficiency, Financialization and Private Credit Bureaus  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency and Formalisation (with Prop.5) 
Dependent variable: Banking System Efficiency 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  100.40*** 22.881** 63.839*** 114.68*** 120.39*** 149.03*** 96.178*** 24.777* 48.068*** 117.32*** 112.75*** 151.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB -0.741 -1.213** -1.096 -0.874 0.069 1.323** -0.799 -1.021 -0.922 -1.408** 0.254 1.107** 
 (0.151) (0.020) (0.186) (0.209) (0.917) (0.013) (0.120) (0.128) (0.322) (0.017) (0.599) (0.029) 
Prop.5 -13.914 33.925*** 23.188 -19.271 -32.29* -20.292 -9.727 47.634*** 38.143* -27.141* -13.85 -33.11* 
 (0.381) (0.002) (0.208) (0.257) (0.097) (0.362) (0.482) (0.009) (0.080) (0.086) (0.330) (0.056) 
PCB×Prop.5 1.311*** 1.461*** 1.439* 1.396** 0.774 -0.558 1.287*** 1.162* 1.312 1.822*** 0.460 -0.363 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.059) (0.031) (0.221) (0.270) (0.003) (0.052) (0.128) (0.001) (0.301) (0.417) 
GDP growth  0.267 0.521 0.407 0.079 -0.009 0.374 0.403 0.973*** 1.058** 0.135 0.201 0.203 
 (0.421) (0.144) (0.410) (0.859) (0.982) (0.415) (0.217) (0.006) (0.046) (0.746) (0.505) (0.560) 
Inflation -0.101* -0.007 -0.063 -0.108* -0.035 -0.026 -0.201** -0.193** -0.595*** -0.192** -0.141*** -0.154*** 
 (0.084) (0.837) (0.252) (0.064) (0.420) (0.451) (0.048) (0.017) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -1.013** -0.738** -1.205** -0.604 -0.299 -1.036*** -0.981** -1.172** -1.128* -0.533 -0.671** -1.213*** 
 (0.010) (0.030) (0.023) (0.157) (0.411) (0.001) (0.012) (0.018) (0.056) (0.173) (0.032) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.065 0.425 -0.260 -0.281 -0.216 -0.477 -0.030 0.142 0.147 -0.198 -0.269 -0.333 
 (0.776) (0.165) (0.453) (0.351) (0.494) (0.197) (0.894) (0.755) (0.713) (0.460) (0.270) (0.214) 
Trade  -0.154*** -0.132** -0.189** -0.246*** -0.100 -0.345*** -0.144*** -0.159* -0.162 -0.241*** -0.130*** -0.308*** 
 (0.002) (0.033) (0.029) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.006) (0.059) (0.113) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Middle Income 4.643 4.194 -3.462 1.085 3.532 29.919*** 4.703 -1.096 -5.435 5.258 6.612 30.566*** 
 (0.189) (0.364) (0.557) (0.840) (0.509) (0.000) (0.203) (0.884) (0.415) (0.288) (0.115) (0.000) 
Common Law -9.986*** -4.199 -8.249 -11.97*** -9.472** -24.33*** -9.113*** -5.552 -9.995 -10.066** -13.66*** -17.38*** 
 (0.000) (0.293) (0.133) (0.009) (0.035) (0.000) (0.002) (0.342) (0.118) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na 40.094 na na na na na 52.541 na -19.446 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.232 0.156 0.138 0.136 0.172 0.257 0.229 0.164 0.140 0.141 0.176 0.282 
Fisher  37.87***      35.13***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency and Informalization (with Prop.7) 
Dependent variable: Financial System Efficiency 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  88.502*** 73.586*** 85.160*** 90.505*** 95.840*** 125.70*** 88.001*** 71.543*** 81.356*** 92.205** 98.090*** 122.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.824*** 0.325** 0.498*** 1.124*** 1.219*** 1.163*** 0.739*** 0.245* 0.476* 0.794*** 1.063*** 1.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prop. 7 15.326 -58.24*** -13.589 26.448* 30.088* 28.572** 12.194 -50.12*** -20.415 22.230* 10.002 25.011 
 (0.342) (0.000) (0.426) (0.063) (0.066) (0.043) (0.412) (0.000) (0.405) (0.068) (0.466) (0.111) 
PCB×Prop.7 -6.333*** -5.804*** -6.265*** -5.596*** -5.704*** -5.449*** -6.167*** -5.820*** -5.715*** -6.279*** -5.521*** -5.316*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.211 0.315 0.368 0.129 0.087 -0.118 0.426 0.727* 0.970 0.081 0.318 0.029 
 (0.530) (0.161) (0.449) (0.740) (0.801) (0.653) (0.189) (0.055) (0.102) (0.794) (0.245) (0.932) 
Inflation -0.066 -0.133*** -0.016 -0.042 0.009 -0.006 -0.144 -0.266*** -0.344*** -0.128* -0.074*** -0.088*** 
 (0.244) (0.000) (0.744) (0.395) (0.802) (0.795) (0.170) (0.000) (0.003) (0.087) (0.008) (0.003) 
Public Invt.  -1.133*** -1.215*** -1.036** -0.647* -0.568 -1.079** -1.091** -1.428*** -0.885 -0.529* -0.432 -1.181*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.030) (0.074) (0.184) (0.018) (0.010) (0.000) (0.184) (0.086) (0.238) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.014 0.150 -0.285 -0.014 -0.113 -0.393* 0.019 0.383 0.017 0.016 -0.093 -0.148 
 (0.955) (0.591) (0.375) (0.954) (0.693) (0.088) (0.935) (0.253) (0.969) (0.937) (0.685) (0.443) 
Trade  -0.184*** -0.162*** -0.191** -0.276*** -0.175*** -0.333*** -0.178*** -0.183*** -0.210* -0.280*** -0.172*** -0.324*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Middle Income 6.597* 5.207 -2.498 5.803 2.695 30.998*** 6.617* 9.198* -1.222 7.024* 5.581 32.730*** 
 (0.065) (0.269) (0.649) (0.197) (0.551) (0.000) (0.071) (0.056) (0.873) (0.064) (0.134) (0.000) 
Common Law -11.51*** -7.748** -11.104** -11.34*** -14.01*** -24.98*** -10.44*** -8.545** -6.935 -11.70*** -14.26*** -22.41*** 
 (0.000) (0.043) (0.028) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  effects na -82.750 na 2.816 17.408 5.560 na -74.697 na -4.286 na na 
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Pseudo R²/R² 0.608 0.213 0.201 0.252 0.348 0.524 0.620 0224 0.200 0.255 0.352 0.545 
Fisher  58.60***      49.25***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial activity is least. na: not applicable because at least one component necessary in the computation of the net effect is not 
statistically significant.   
 
 
 
Table 6: Financial Allocation Activity, Financialization and Private Credit Bureaus  
             
 Panel A: Banking System Activity and Formalization (with Prop. 5) 
Dependent variable: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -18.14*** -8.882*** -3.587 -5.659* -11.424* -3.846 -18.43*** -8.617*** -3.002 -6.431* -13.379* -8.615 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.147) (0.060) (0.050) (0.625) (0.001) (0.000) (0.239) (0.062) (0.077) (0.576) 
PCB -0.329 -0.901*** -1.044*** -0.723*** -0.131 -0.890*** -0.350 -0.738*** -0.988*** -0.697*** 0.003 -0.733 
 (0.201) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.609) (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.991) (0.177) 
Prop.5 62.138*** 26.805*** 23.929*** 36.648*** 61.417*** 42.802*** 63.038*** 26.503*** 23.697*** 39.86*** 68.708*** 56.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCB×Prop.5 0.391* 1.176*** 1.312*** 0.952*** 0.260 0.656*** 0.394* 1.029*** 1.278*** 0.915*** 0.120 0.442 
 (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.005) (0.077) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.689) (0.328) 
GDP growth  -0.263 -0.188*** -0.240** -0.047 -0.013 -0.435*** -0.185 -0.146 -0.039 0.012 0.009 -0.228 
 (0.196) (0.003) (0.040) (0.673) (0.923) (0.001) (0.397) (0.205) (0.274) (0.908) (0.957) (0.300) 
Inflation -0.055** -0.068*** -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 -0.054*** -0.091* -0.102*** -0.141*** -0.015 -0.040** -0.070** 
 (0.026) (0.000) (0.214) (0.347) (0.264) (0.001) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.027) (0.035) 
Public Invt.  -0.677*** -0.031 0.070 -0.132 -0.674*** -0.267* -0.745*** -0.050 -0.082 -0.218* -0.975*** -0.676** 
 (0.000) (0.617) (0.602) (0.203) (0.000) (0.063) (0.000) (0.667) (0.515) (0.060) (0.000) (0.014) 
Foreign Aid  -0.247** -0.009 -0.099 -0.123* -0.461*** -0.378** -0.276** 0.006 -0.057 -0.185** -0.462*** -0.376 
 (0.032) (0.809) (0.155) (0.085) (0.000) (0.042) (0.018) (0.926) (0.393) (0.018) (0.002) (0.200) 
Trade  -0.014 -0.014** -0.031* -0.043*** -0.012 0.087*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.026* -0.038** -0.003 0.043 
 (0.640) (0.027) (0.060) (0.008) (0.582) (0.001) (0.759) (0.425) (0.085) (0.033) (0.894) (0.374) 
Middle Income 4.652*** -1.942*** -1.614 0.181 7.531*** 26.069*** 4.566** -2.156** -1.846 -0.246 5.747** 25.603*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.196) (0.888) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.021) (0.119) (0.865) (0.019) (0.000) 
Common Law -6.437*** -1.944*** -1.035 -6.083*** -10.22*** -5.599*** -6.145** -1.262 -1.091 -6.687*** -12.55*** -6.610* 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.333) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.014) (0.186) (0.303) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) 
Net  effects 63.007 31.771 39.564 40.668 na 45.572 64.701 30.848 29.093 43.724 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.453 0.288 0.264 0.272 0.356 0.460 0.458 0.295 0.275 0.274 0.363 0.479 
Fisher  79.18***      70.50***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity and Informalization (with Prop. 7) 
Dependent variable: Financial System Activity 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  46.445*** 16.230*** 19.938*** 35.420*** 55.419*** 48.007*** 46.700*** 15.739*** 21.242*** 37.945*** 59.485*** 52.372*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB 0.172** 0.373*** 0.420*** 0.385*** 0.210*** -0.129 0.149* 0.424*** 0.432*** 0.358*** 0.153** -0.155 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.396) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.369) 
Prop.7 -66.55*** -21.84*** -22.75*** -41.35*** -69.38*** -54.57*** -66.99*** -21.52*** -25.60*** -43.77*** -75.85*** -66.58*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
PCB×Prop. 7 -3.268*** -4.096*** -4.098*** -3.631*** -3.228*** -3.876*** -3.232*** -3.726*** -3.796*** -3.686*** -2.989*** -3.685*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.203 -0.160** -0.166 0.028 0.068 -0.239 -0.121 -0.033 -0.060 0.027 0.025 -0.105 
 (0.333) (0.033) (0.226) (0.874) (0.671) (0.401) (0.591) (0.794) (0.543) (0.846) (0.882) (0.772) 
Inflation -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.058*** -0.022 -0.035** -0.059* -0.110** -0.110*** -0.152*** -0.133*** -0.069*** -0.078* 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.312) (0.048) (0.090) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) 
Public Invt.  -0.753*** -0.081 -0.054 -0.326** -0.855*** -0.604** -0.803*** -0.054 -0.086 -0.374*** -1.022*** -0.755** 
 (0.000) (0.230) (0.643) (0.027) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.636) (0.438) (0.004) (0.000) (0.039) 
Foreign Aid  -0.266** -0.030 -0.021 -0.145 -0.485*** -0.361 -0.291** -0.003 -0.018 -0.183* -0.527*** -0.346 
 (0.026) (0.428) (0.793) (0.211) (0.000) (0.310) (0.014) (0.962) (0.757) (0.056) (0.000) (0.355) 
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Trade  -0.023 -0.016** -0.033* -0.055** -0.025 0.026 -0.019 -0.009 -0.022* -0.059** -0.0005 0.022 
 (0.441) (0.014) (0.070) (0.033) (0.283) (0.612) (0.546) (0.416) (0.079) (0.011) (0.983) (0.692) 
Middle Income 5.351*** -0.591 -0.192 1.049 7.366*** 26.399*** 5.222*** -1.211 -2.005* 0.492 4.513** 24.517*** 
 (0.003) (0.334) (0.896) (0.610) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.191) (0.057) (0.782) (0.035) (0.000) 
Common Law -7.790*** -1.498*** -2.264* -8.694*** -13.57*** -8.321* -7.343*** -1.000 -2.012** -8.039*** -14.63*** -10.661** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.005) (0.302) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
Net  effects -80.350 -39.137 -40.055 -56.683 -83.011 -70.938 -80.638 -37.254 -41.630 -59.335 -88.472 -82.141 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.700 0.331 0.320 0.356 0.465 0.591 0.708 0.336 0.330 0.362 0.474 0.609 
Fisher  129.71***      100.18***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. Public Invt: Public Investment. Mobile: Mobile phone 
penetration rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial activity is least. na: not applicable because at least one component necessary in the computation of the net effect is not 
statistically significant.   
 
 
 
The following findings can be established from Table 6 on linkages between ‘private 
credit bureaus, financial informalization and financial activity’. In Panel A, the net effect of 
private credit bureaus in financial formalization for financial activity in the banking system is (i) 
consistently positive with a positive threshold from the (i) 10
th
 to the 90
th
 quantiles, for the most 
part on the LHS and (ii) consistently positive from the 10
th
 to the 50
th
 quintile on the RHS. For 
both the LHS and RHS, the fact that corresponding conditional and unconditional effects are 
consistently positive is evidence of ‘synergy effects’. In Panel B, the net effect of ‘private credit 
bureaus in financial informalization for financial activity in the financial system’ is negative with  
consistent negative thresholds from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 quintiles. Most of the significant control 
variables display expected signs. 
Positive thresholds are established when net impacts consistently display increasing 
positive magnitude and/or decreasing negative magnitudes throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial access. Conversely, negative thresholds are represented by consistent 
decreasing positive and/or increasing negative net effects. Therefore, evidence of a threshold 
tendency confirms the motivation of modelling based on initial levels of financial access, with 
the view that financial access rewards from financialization and information sharing offices may 
consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with increasing initial levels of financial 
development. 
 
4.3 Leveraging on the synergy between information sharing offices and financial 
formalization  
Comparing the findings of Tables 3-6 leads to one major conclusion:  the positive 
complementarity of information sharing offices and financial formalization is an increasing 
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function of financial activity whereas the negative complementarity of information sharing 
offices and financial informalization is a decreasing function of financial activity. In what 
follows, we offer some propositions on how to leverage the synergy between information sharing 
offices and financial formalization for enhanced financial access. A policy relevant avenue is to 
enhance the nexus with new information and communication technologies (ICT) because of two 
main reasons. On the one hand, ICTs are natural instruments by which information sharing 
offices can enhance their fundamental role of information sharing. On the other, ICT-banking 
has been recently documented to be positively (negatively) associated with the informal (formal) 
financial sector in Africa (Asongu, 2013). Therefore, the directions for policy we propose are 
four measures that can be employed to enhance the formalisation of ICT-banking in order to 
boost financial access. 
First and foremost, information sharing offices can leverage ICT in boosting financial 
access and interbank competition for two main reasons, (1) information sharing offices boost 
competition in order to consolidate access to finance and (2) information sharing offices also 
play the role of disciplining devices by not encouraging borrowers to default on their debts on 
the premise that they want to resort to the informal financial sector as a viable alternative to the 
formal financial sector.  
Second, mobile finance can be encouraged by tailoring policy along two main mobile 
banking angles. (i) information sharing offices can leverage on the evidence that ICT enable 
users to store currency. In essence, information sharing offices should promote ‘mobile banking’ 
activities that are related to real bank accounts in the formal financial sector, compared to pseudo 
bank accounts in the informal financial sector and (ii)  information sharing offices should 
encourage users in rural/remote localities to use ICT-banking formally in cashing-out and/or 
cashing-in. The motivation for this recommendation builds on the fact that if ICT-banking is 
formal banks can easily utilise the mobilised deposits to increase financial access.  
  Third, in situations where informal financial services are indispensible, information 
sharing offices should encourage ‘partially integrated-ICT savings compared to basic informal 
savings which do not earn any interest. An example of a basic saving is the mobile transfer M-
PESA system that is used to store money in Kenya.  Accordingly, by encouraging ‘partially 
integrated’ savings, corresponding mobilised deposits can be used to boost financial access.  
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 Fourth, in a nutshell information sharing offices should encourage formalised ICT-
banking by leveraging on the following mechanisms for the proposed formalisation. (i) ICT can 
be tailored toward increasing the store of value in the formal financial sector because the 
subscriber identity module (SIM) is similar to a smartcard (or virtual bank card), (ii) ICT-
banking can also be used for instant access to bank accounts (used for transactions) given that it 
is also acts as an automated teller machine (ATM) and (iii) ICT-banking also serves as a point of 
sale (POS) terminal because it enables transactions and communications with formal banking 
institutions.  
 
5. Conclusions and further research directions 
This study has assessed the role of information sharing in financialization (or coexistence of 
financial sub-systems) for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and 
non-contemporary Fixed Effects and Quantile regressions in 53 African countries for the period 
2004-2011. The relevance of the estimation strategy is motivated by the intuition that blanket 
policy recommendations from mean values of financial access are likely to be ineffective unless 
they are based on initial levels of financial access tailored differently across countries with high, 
intermediate and low levels of financial access.  
The following findings are established. First, the net effect of information sharing offices 
in financial formalization for allocation efficiency in the banking system is selectively positive 
across the conditional distributions. Second, the net effect of information sharing offices in 
financial informalization for allocation efficiency in the financial system is sparingly negative, 
with a few positive effects in private credit bureaus-oriented contemporary regressions. Third, 
the net effect of information sharing offices in financial formalization for financial activity in the 
banking system is positive for the most part with synergy effects. Synergy effects are derived 
from the fact that the corresponding conditional and unconditional impacts are consistently 
positive. Fourth, the net effect of information sharing offices in financial informalization for 
financial activity in the financial system is negative with some evidence of consistent negative 
thresholds, especially in private credit bureaus-oriented regressions.  
Positive thresholds are established when net impacts consistently display increasing 
positive magnitude and/or decreasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial access. Conversely, negative thresholds are represented by consistently 
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decreasing positive and/or increasing negative net effects. Therefore, evidence of a threshold 
tendency confirms the motivation of modelling based on initial levels of financial access, with 
the view that financial access rewards from financialization and information sharing offices may 
consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with increasing initial levels of financial 
development. Therefore, the positive complementarity of information sharing offices and 
financial formalization is an increasing function of financial activity whereas the negative 
complementarity of information sharing offices and financial informalization is a decreasing 
function of financial activity. In order to leverage on the synergy between information sharing 
offices and financial formalization for enhanced financial access, some policy measures have 
been proposed.  
The engagement of hitherto unexplored dimensions of financialization merges two 
streams of literature by simultaneously contributing to the evolving studies on measuring 
financial development as well as to the economic development literature on mechanisms by 
which information sharing offices and financialization influence financial access. This twofold 
contribution also provides insights into a pragmatic way of disentangling the complementarity 
between different financial sectors and information sharing offices for financial access. Future 
inquiries can improve the established nexuses by examining the role of information and 
communication technology like mobile phones and internet penetration in the effectiveness of 
information sharing offices in enhancing financial access.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
 
   
Financial Sector Development  Prop. 5 Financial Sector Formalization  Asongu (2014a, 
2015ab) 
  
Prop. 7 Financial Sector Informalization 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Middle Income Middle I Middle and Upper  Income Countries ($1,006 or more) Asongu (2014b) 
   
Low Income  Low I Low Income Countries  ($1,005 or less) 
    
Common Law Common L English Common Law Countries  La Porta et al. (2008) 
   
Civil Law Civil L Civil Law Countries  
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
Financial 
Access  
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp) 28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
       
Fin. Sector 
Development 
Financial Formalization   (Prop. 5) 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Informalization  (Prop. 7) 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
Income 
Levels and 
Legal 
Origins  
Low Income Countries  0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 424 
Middle Income Countries  0.490 0.500 0.000 1.000 424 
English Common Law 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 424 
Civil Law 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 424 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. GDPg: GDP 
growth.  
.  
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        Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 291) 
               
Financial Access Info. Asymmetry FS Development  Control Variables Fixed Effects  
Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity         Income Levels  Legal Origins   
BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof PCR PCB Prop.5 Prop.7 GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade Middle I. Low I. Common L. Civil L.  
1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.154 0.303 0.119 -0.097 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 0.073 -0.073 -0.047 0.047 Bcbd 
 1.000 0.583 0.743 0.067 0.510 0.384 -0.365 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 0.132 -0.132 0.071 -0.071 FcFd 
  1.000 0.922 0.448 0.439 0.591 -0.580 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 0.401 -0.401 0.136 -0.136 Pcrb 
   1.000 0.293 0.556 0.685 -0.676 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 0.356 -0.356 0.191 -0.191 Pcrbof 
    1.000 -0.140 0.094 -0.083 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 0.218 -0.218 -0.121 0.121 PCR 
     1.000 0.613 -0.598 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 0.328 -0.328 0.433 -0.433 PCB 
      1.000 -0.983 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 0.398 -0.398 0.435 -0.435 Prop.5 
       1.000 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 -0.363 0.363 -0.462 0.462 Prop.7 
        1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 -0.022 0.022 0.009 -0.009 GDPg 
         1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.116 0.116 0.152 -0.152 Inflation  
          1.000 0.059 0.130 0.079 -0.079 -0.169 0.169 PubIvt 
           1.000 -0.309 -0.603 0.603 -0.068 0.068 NODA 
            1.000 0.502 -0.502 0.068 -0.068 Trade 
             1.000 -1.000 0.087 -0.087 Middle I. 
              1.000 -0.087 0.087 Low I. 
               1.000 -1.000 Common L. 
               -1.000 1.000 Civil L. 
                  
BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial 
institutions. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop. 7: Financial Sector Informalization. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: 
Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Middle I: Middle Income. Low. I: Low Income. Common L: Common Law: Civil L.: Civil Law. Info: 
Information. Fin: Financial. FS Development: Financial Sector Development.  
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